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ON MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS
Milan Vego
Major naval operations are the principal methods of combat force employ-ment by which operational or strategic objectives are accomplished in a
conventional high-intensity war at sea. The U.S. Navy and other major Western
navies planned and executed a large number of major naval operations in World
War II as part of maritime and, in several cases, land campaigns. However, such
major operations have been conducted on few occasions since 1945. The main
reason for that is that none of the numerous regional conflicts fought in the past
sixty years have involved large navies on both sides.
The U.S. Navy and other major navies are currently
involved in operations short of war, such as peace-
keeping and peace enforcement, maritime intercep-
tion operations (MIO), and protection of friendly
shipping against various hostile acts on the high seas,
such as piracy or transnational terrorism. Among
other things, they are also employed in preventing il-
legal immigration and drug smuggling. In some cases,
employment of one’s naval forces, such as support or
counterinsurgency (COIN) or MIO, might be aimed
at achieving operational objectives. However, such ac-
tions lack many attributes of conventional major na-
val or joint operations. The focus here is exclusively on
those planned and conducted in a conventional
high-intensity conflict.
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WHAT IS A MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION?
There is no common agreement in the United States or the West on a definition
of what constitutes a major naval operation. The term “naval operation” so often
used by the U.S. Navy and other Western navies is too broad and imprecise. For
example, “naval operation” is explained in the U.S. military as pertaining to “a
naval action or the performance of naval missions, which may be strategical, tac-
tical, logistical, or training.” This definition apparently does not make any dis-
tinction between objectives to be accomplished at sea and corresponding
methods of combat force employment. It confuses the issue by mixing the com-
bat employment of naval forces with logistics and training. An alternative mean-
ing of the same term is “the process of carrying out or training for naval combat
to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.”1 The absence of the term “major
naval operation” is a clear proof of the lack of a coherent theory of operational
warfare at sea. The U.S. Navy also still does not have a servicewide doctrine fo-
cused on the operational level of war at sea. Yet operational art is the principal
focus of all joint doctrinal documents in the U.S. military.
In comparison, the former Soviet navy devoted extraordinary efforts to de-
veloping a theory of what it called “naval operations” in the early 1930s and
through the 1980s. Naval operations constituted the very heart of the Soviets’
naval operational art. Yet the Soviets were distinctly unsuccessful in applying
their theories in practice during the war with Nazi Germany, 1941–45. From
1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet navy was never in-
volved in real combat. Hence, one can only speculate whether its actual perfor-
mance would have been any better than it was during World War II.
In one of the many Soviet definitions of the term, a naval operation
(morskaya operatsiya) was described as a series of naval battles, engagements,
and strikes coordinated in terms of objective, place, and time and conducted in
an assigned area (zone) of an oceanic or sea theater of military action (TVD in
the Russian acronym, theater of operations in Western terms). It was carried out
by specially established groups, independently or in cooperation with formations,
forces, or troop units of other services, according to a common idea and plan for
accomplishing a single and especially important operational or operational-
tactical task. Naval operations are controlled by a fleet commander.2
In generic terms, a major naval operation can be understood as a series of re-
lated major and minor naval tactical actions conducted by several naval combat
arms and combat arms of other services, in terms of time and place, and aimed to
accomplish an operational (and sometimes limited strategic) objective in a given mari-
time theater. Major naval operations are planned and conducted in accordance with
an operational idea (scheme) and common plan. They are normally an integral
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part of a maritime or land campaign, but they can sometimes be conducted outside
of the framework of a campaign.
The best (and proven) way of avoiding attrition at the operational and strate-
gic levels is by planning and executing major operations and campaigns, respec-
tively. With a major naval operation, the stronger side at sea can defeat the
weaker in a place and at a time of its own choosing. Major naval operations are
normally planned and conducted when decisive results have to be accomplished
as quickly as possible and at the least loss.3 Successful major naval/joint opera-
tions can contribute considerably to shortening a war at sea.
The Roots
In the era of sail and until the late nineteenth century, the principal method of
combat employment of one’s fleet to attain an operational or strategic objective
was the “decisive naval battle.” Some decisive battles—for example, the battle of
Trafalgar on 21 October 1805—led to drastic changes in the strategic situation at
sea. Combat employment of naval forces gradually changed with the technolog-
ical advances of the middle and late nineteenth century. The steady improve-
ment in the performance of ships’ steam propulsion plants and the internal
combustion engine had made it possible to fit powerful engines in even small
ships. The introduction of torpedoes and mines led to the design of new small
platforms capable of posing a serious threat to the survivability of larger ships.
This, in turn, led to a proliferation of small warships of all types and classes. The
numerical strength of the major navies steadily increased. In addition to battle-
ships and cruisers, they also included a large number of smaller surface combat-
ants, such as destroyers, torpedo craft, gunboats, and auxiliaries.4
By the end of the nineteenth century the importance of a decisive battle had
been steadily reduced because of the increased size and changing composition of
the major navies. Instead of single decisive battles to achieve an operational or
even strategic objective, war at sea between two strong opponents was fought
over a large area and almost continuously. Numerous tactical actions were con-
ducted by both large and smaller surface combatants. Operational deployment
of combat forces became an integral part of a major clash between opposing
fleet forces instead of something separate. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–
1905 was the first conflict at sea in which diverse naval actions were conducted
almost continuously. These actions occurred over large parts of the Yellow Sea, the
Sea of Japan, and parts of the Pacific Ocean.5 In retrospect, the battle of
Tsushima in May 1905 was the last “decisive” naval battle in history. Yet this was
not grasped by the theoreticians or practitioners of the day. Up to the beginning
of World War I, all the world’s major navies planned to seek a decisive battle
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(also called “general fleet action”) and thereby obtain command of the sea in a
single clash of battle fleets.
In the last decade before the outbreak of World War I, the major navies con-
tinued to build both large and small naval vessels in quantity. For example, by
1914, the Royal Navy had in service 542 warships, including sixty-eight battle-
ships, 110 cruisers, and 218 destroyers. The Imperial German Navy then had 301
ships (thirty-seven battleships, forty-eight cruisers, 142 destroyers, forty-seven
torpedo boats, and twenty-seven U-boats).6 The advent of submarine and air-
craft added second and third dimensions to the maritime battlefield. The ability
to control the movements and actions of fleet elements over large ocean areas
was considerably enhanced by new signaling devices and wireless telegraph.
Fleet commanders were able to communicate with subordinate tactical com-
manders many hundreds of miles out at sea. The cumulative effect of all these
technological advances was to make major navies of the day capable of conduct-
ing actions almost continuously, over large sea or even ocean areas, and employ-
ing diverse platforms and weapons. The very size of the major navies of the day,
with their widely dispersed bases and installations, made it increasingly difficult,
if not impossible, to achieve decisive results by a general fleet action.
During World War I several large-scale fleet-versus-fleet actions took place,
in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea.
Of these, the battle of Jutland, fought on 31 May–1 June 1916, came closest to
what can be considered a major naval operation. It comprised a series of small
engagements and attacks aimed at operational objectives. Admiral Reinhard
Scheer (1863–1928), the commander of the German High Seas Fleet (Hochsee-
flotte), planned to sail out from Wilhelmshaven at about midnight on 30 May
and then proceed northward, staying well off the Danish coast, and arrive the
next afternoon off the western entrance to the Skagerrak. Afterward, the main
body of the High Seas Fleet and Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper (1863–1932),
commander of the Scouting Group (battle cruisers), would jointly launch an at-
tack on the British merchant ships and cruiser escorts that German intelligence
believed to be in the area. Afterward, Hipper with his battle cruisers would head
north and advertise his location by steaming very close to the Norwegian coast
in broad daylight, while Scheer would sail some fifty miles to the rear but out of
sight of shore. Scheer was confident that as soon as the British learned the
whereabouts of Hipper’s battle cruisers they would send their battle cruisers on
a high-speed dash across the North Sea to cut off Hipper’s retreat to his home
base. Scheer’s plan was to attack the enemy battle cruisers jointly with Hipper’s
force next morning.7 In short, the German plan was to bring the strength of the
British Grand Fleet down to parity with that of the High Seas Fleet.8 By coinci-
dence Jellicoe also planned a sortie with his Grand Fleet to the Skagerrak area on
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1 June 1916. His main objective was to lure the German High Seas Fleet to the
north and fight a general fleet action. As it turned out, Scheer sortied only one
day earlier than Jellicoe planned.9
In the ensuing clash of the opposing forces, the Germans won a tactical vic-
tory in terms of losses in materiel and personnel inflicted on the Grand Fleet.
The British lost fourteen ships (three battle cruisers, three armored cruisers,
eight destroyers/torpedo boats) and some 6,100 men (out of a total of sixty thou-
sand), while the German losses amounted to eleven ships (one predreadnought
battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and five destroyers/torpedo
boats) and about 2,550 men (out of thirty-six thousand).10 However, operational
success was clearly achieved by the British. In the aftermath of the battle the situ-
ation in the North Sea and adjacent sea areas remained essentially what it had
been before the battle. Both opponents continued to watch each other and acted
essentially as active fleets-in-being. The Entente’s blockade of the Central
Powers was not weakened. The Royal Navy continued to ferry troops and sup-
plies across the English Channel to France. The Germans retained their naval
control of the Baltic theater.
The first major naval operation against the enemy coast was conducted by the
Austro-Hungarian fleet, shortly after Italy’s decision to enter the war on the side
of the Entente Powers on 24 May 1915. This operation had been planned by the
Austro-Hungarian navy’s commander in chief, Admiral Anton Haus (1851–
1917), in 1910, even though Italy was formally his country’s ally at that time. The
main objective of that raid was to cut off Italian rail communications along the
eastern coast of the Adriatic leading to the front on the Isonzo River. Another
objective was to create fear and possibly panic among the Italian populace living
in the coastal area.11 The Austrian assumption was that the Italians would try at
the very outset of the hostilities to achieve a decision by employing their entire
fleet in the northern Adriatic. Hence, the Austrians also decided to employ a ma-
jor part of their fleet in the operation.12 The action would be successful only if
full surprise was achieved, and that meant it had to be carried out shortly after
the beginning of hostilities.13
The Austro-Hungarian fleet carried out the raid as planned and employed
rather large forces: four battleships, one armored and five protected cruisers, six
large destroyers, seven destroyers, and thirty torpedo boats. The Austrian ships
and naval aircraft bombarded fourteen ports and the coastal railroad from Ven-
ice to Brindisi. Targets included ports Porto Corsini (near Ravenna), Senigallia,
Rimini, Ancona, the Potenza estuary, and Venice.14 The Austrian aircraft con-
ducted raids against Venice and airship hangars at Chiaravalle. The Austrian
ships also sank three Italian destroyers. This was the largest action of the
Austro-Hungarian fleet during the entire war. The Austrian bombardment of
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the coastal settlements and rail lines caused little material damage; Italian mo-
rale, however, was significantly depressed. There was a widespread belief among
the Italian populace that their navy could not prevent such raids in the future.
Moreover, it was believed that the Italian fleet was incapable of conducting simi-
lar actions against the Austro-Hungarian coast.15
During World War I, the first major joint naval operations emerged: the En-
tente’s amphibious landing at Gallipoli in April 1915 and the German landing
on the Latvian coast in October 1917 are the best known examples. The princi-
pal objectives of the Gallipoli landing operation were to take Turkey out of the
war, open a direct link with the Entente’s embattled ally Russia, force the Ger-
mans to shift troops from the Russian front, and influence Greece to side openly
with the Entente Powers.16 The allied attack on the Dardanelles was poorly
planned and executed. The naval plan prepared by Admiral Sackville Carden
was approved on 13 January 1915, and a formal decision for the attack was made
on 28 January. Carden’s plan was to use twelve old battleships, three battle cruis-
ers, three light cruisers, one flotilla leader, sixteen destroyers, six submarines,
four seaplanes, twelve minesweepers, and some miscellaneous craft for the naval
attack on the Dardanelles.17 In a major omission, Carden was never directed to
integrate the naval attack with the landing of ground forces.18 Naval bombard-
ment started on 19 February; and bombardment of the outer forts started on 25
February. The initial attacks were fairly successful. However, the Turkish resis-
tance proved to be much greater than anticipated. The Turks also heavily mined
the straits, and the allied minesweepers were unable to clear the mines. On 18
March, out of sixteen battleships that ultimately took part in the bombardment,
three battleships—two British and one French—ran into mines and were sunk,
and three others were heavily damaged.19 The British and French losses included
seven hundred sailors killed in a single day.
After the failure of the naval attack, the allies finally made a decision to com-
mit ground troops to capture control of the straits. The initial forces for ground
assault consisted of about seventy-five thousand British troops under General
Sir Ian Hamilton. Specifically, this force comprised the British 29th Division and
the Royal Naval Division, and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
(ANZAC), composed of the 1st Australian Division and the New Zealand and
Australian Division. In addition, the French made available on 10 March some
eighteen thousand colonial troops of the 1st Division.20 The Turkish defenses
of the straits were greatly improved after 24 March when the German general
Liman von Sanders took command of the Turkish Fifth Army at the Dardanelles.
He had to defend a coastline of 150 miles with just eighty-four thousand men (of
whom only sixty-two thousand were combat ready) organized in six divisions.
Only about twenty thousand men were defending the Gallipoli Peninsula.
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The main landing at Cape Helles was carried out by about thirty-five thou-
sand men of the 29th Division and elements of the Royal Naval Division on 25
April. Smaller, diversionary landings took place the same day, involving some
seventeen thousand largely untrained troops of the New Zealand and Australian
Corps, farther north at Ari Burnu (later renamed Anzac Cove). The 6th Colonial
Regiment of the French 1st Division conducted a temporary landing at Kum
Kale at the neck of the peninsula.21
The allied troops seized the initial lodgment ashore but were unable to en-
large it because of stiff resistance by the Turks. The fighting evolved into trench
warfare. Neither side was able to gain much ground, and both suffered heavy
losses. By August 1915, the allied forces amounted to twelve divisions. A new
landing was conducted in early August at Suvla Bay aimed to link with the
ANZAC forces at Anzac Cove. After some gains, the entire operation ultimately
failed, and the Turks recaptured Suvla Bay.
Despite all these efforts, the Allied troops were unable to make much progress
on land. In the end, there was no other option but to abandon the entire opera-
tion. The evacuation was carried out in two stages: on 18–19 December 1915
and 8–9 January 1916. Losses on both sides were heavy. The allies eventually
committed a total of about 490,000 troops (including seventy-nine thousand
French) to the operation and suffered 252,000 casualties (including about
44,100 killed). The Turks employed some 500,000 troops and suffered about
251,300 casualties (including some 86,700 killed).22
A more successful amphibious landing operation was Operation ALBION,
conducted by the German navy and army in October 1917. This was the first
German joint operation of such size and complexity. The operational objective
was to seize control of the island of Oesel and thereby open the Gulf of Riga and
thus threaten the rear of the Russian Twelfth Army, defending the Baltic coast.
The aim was to land one reinforced division on the island of Oesel. Tagga Bay
was selected as the landing objective area. Based on the lessons learned from the
Entente’s failure in the landing at Gallipoli, the Germans committed about
24,600 men, supported by a large naval force.23 The Germans achieved complete
surprise, and the entire operation was a resounding success. The Twelfth Army
was eventually destroyed, and the threat to the flank of General Oskar von
Hutier’s German Eighth Army was eliminated.24
World War I at sea proved that the fleets of the major opponents were too large
and deployed too widely to be destroyed during a single general fleet action or
even two. It signaled the final demise of the decisive battle. It also demonstrated that
operational objectives in the theater could be accomplished primarily by a series of
related major and minor naval tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in
time and place—in modern terms, a major naval operation. Deployment,
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clashes of opposing forces, pursuit, and withdrawal/redeployment were meshed
to constitute a seamless whole. The entire naval operation was planned, pre-
pared, and conducted by a single commander. It was based on a definite idea and
a common plan.
In the interwar years, most major Western navies, and also the Japanese navy,
focused almost exclusively on the practical application of operational warfare,
through planning, war gaming, and exercises at sea. In 1927, the U.S. Naval War
College adopted for the first time the study of “operational” problems in addi-
tion to “strategical” and “tactical” ones. This practice continued in the 1930s. In
war games held at the Naval War College in the 1930s the U.S. Navy repeatedly
tested its plan ORANGE for operational employment of fleet forces in a hypo-
thetical war with Japan. In the early 1930s, the U.S. Marine Corps embarked on
an intensive effort to create its first operational doctrine for large-scale amphibi-
ous landings. The result was the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, issued
in 1934. This manual borrowed heavily from the proper lessons learned in the
Entente’s unsuccessful Gallipoli landing in 1915 and the successful German
ALBION operation. After 1935 this document was used as a guide for amphibious
exercises and research and development.25
The German navy used planning games, war games, and exercises extensively
in preparing for a future war at sea. By the early 1930s it had introduced “opera-
tional,” in addition to strategic and tactical, war games. In the late 1930s, as a re-
sult of these games, the German naval high command became convinced of the
prospective need to seize parts of the southern Norwegian coast and the French
Atlantic coast in order to escape the constraints imposed by the geography of the
North Sea and to be able to employ its forces operationally in the Atlantic. The
tactical concept of using U-boats at night and on the surface was first described
in 1922 in a study by two German naval officers. Their ideas were refined during
war games in the early 1930s and became part of the U-boat doctrine in 1935.26
This innovative concept was tested for the first time during the large-scale
Wehrmacht exercises held in the fall of 1937. Doenitz used shortwave radio from
his flagship in Kiel and directed the employment of submarine groups in the
Baltic. Afterward, the concept was tested during another, larger exercise held in
the North Sea. In May 1939 the U-boats operated in groups in the Atlantic off
Cape Finisterre and in the Bay of Biscay for the first time.27
In contrast, the Soviets focused on developing a theory of naval operations as
part of their emerging theory of operational art. Their theories were incorpo-
rated into the Red Navy’s doctrine. The Soviet Field Manual of 1930 (BU-30) was
the first doctrinal document to spell out the rudiments of joint operational em-
ployment of naval forces and ground troops. Afterward, the Soviets developed
the theory of what they called “naval operations”—specifically, reconnaissance,
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amphibious landings and anti-amphibious operations, and operations on sea
lines of communications. Five years later, the Soviet navy adopted the new Combat
Manual of Naval Forces (BU-MS-37). Here for the first time was presented an elab-
oration of “naval operations” and “day-to-day (routine) activities” as the princi-
pal methods by which the combat employment of naval forces and aviation would
accomplish operational objectives. The new manual envisaged a dozen types of
naval operations, aimed at destroying the enemy forces at sea, against coastal “ob-
jects” (installations), on sea communications and blockade, in support of own sea
communications and counterblockade, landing operations, antilanding opera-
tions, and operations in support of the army flank. The day-to-day activities of the
fleet forces would accomplish operational objectives by establishing what the
Soviets called a “favorable operational regime” in their coastal waters and deploy-
ment areas.28 Soviet views on the nature of modern warfare at sea and operational
art were incorporated into the Provisional Manual on Conduct of Operations
(NMO-40), issued in 1940. However, the Soviet theory of naval operations was
very poorly applied during the country’s war with Nazi Germany.
In World War II, all the major navies conducted, independently or in cooper-
ation with other services of the armed forces, a large number of major naval op-
erations in all the maritime theaters of war. Among many major naval
operations, a few stand out because of their importance to the course of the war.
Major clashes of opposing surface forces in the Pacific (notably the battles of the
Coral Sea in May 1942, Midway in June 1942, the Philippine Sea in June 1944,
and Leyte in October 1944) were not “battles” as such but major naval opera-
tions. In the Atlantic Ocean, the Germans in May 1941 conducted a major naval
operation (RHEINUEBUNG), with Combat Group Bismarck (the 42,600-ton battle-
ship Bismarck and the fifteen-thousand-ton heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen), aimed at
interrupting Allied maritime traffic in the North Atlantic. The escape in Febru-
ary 1942 of two German battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, of 38,100
tons at full load) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from Brest to Kiel through
the English Channel (Operation CERBERUS) was a major naval operation. The
purpose was to redeploy these heavy ships away from where they had been
threatening Allied maritime traffic in the southwest approaches to England,
moving them to Norway to strengthen German defenses against possible Allied
invasion. The British carrier attack on the Italian naval base at Taranto in No-
vember 1940 (JUDGMENT) and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Decem-
ber 1941 (HAWAII) were also major naval operations aimed at destroying major
parts of enemy fleets at their bases. The Allies also conducted many major am-
phibious landing operations in all theaters during World War II, especially in the
Pacific.
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Since the end of World War II only a few major naval operations have been
conducted. One reason is that most regional wars in that time have not involved
major navies. Two exceptions, however, were the blockade of North Korea’s coast
during the Korean War (1950–53) and the American blockade of the South Viet-
namese coast (MARKET TIME, March 1965–December 1972). The Israelis
planned and conducted what can be considered a major naval operation to ob-
tain local sea control off the Egyptian and Syrian coasts during the Yom Kippur
(Ramadan) War of October 1973. The British recapture of the Falklands in 1982
(Operation CORPORATE) was a major naval/joint operation with a limited strate-
gic objective. The operations of the coalition naval forces in the Gulf War of
1990–91 and also in the war against Iraq in 2003 (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM),
to establish and maintain control of the northern part of the Arabian (Persian)
Gulf, constituted a major combined naval operation.
Purpose
In terms of its principal purpose, a major naval operation can be offensive or de-
fensive. Offensive major naval operations are normally conducted by the stronger
side at sea, but they also can be planned on the defensive. The stronger side would
mount a single major naval operation or several in succession to obtain and then
maintain sea control. Such operations can also greatly reduce or eliminate threats
posed by numerically larger forces and thereby facilitate operations in other parts
of a maritime theater, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor illustrates. An offen-
sive major naval operation can also be planned as part of a defensive campaign, as
was the Japanese commitment of a major part of the Combined Fleet in defense of
the Philippines in October 1944. Major naval operations against enemy maritime
trade and amphibious landing operations are inherently offensive in their
purpose.
A major naval operation with an offensive purpose is usually planned and
conducted in the initial phase of the war to obtain sea control and afterward in
exercising sea control. It can also be conducted when one side has only local and
temporary control, as Allied amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II
illustrate. Major naval operations in enclosed and semienclosed seas (collec-
tively called “narrow seas”) can be conducted within either a strategically offen-
sive or a strategically defensive framework. For either one, limited, temporary
sea control should be obtained first. Major naval operations aimed at protecting
maritime trade can be conducted even when command of the sea is in dispute.
The main factor for success then is at least control of the sea, the subsurface, and
the air in the proximity of a large convoy. For example, the Royal Navy mounted
several major operations in 1942 to supply the besieged island of Malta, al-
though Axis forces possessed overwhelming strength in the air. The Allies
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suffered extremely high losses in these operations from Axis land-based aircraft
and submarines. It is also possible to conduct a major naval operation when
friendly forces control only the air and the subsurface, as the Germans did in
capturing the key bases and ports in the initial phase of their invasion of Norway
in April 1940.
A defensive major naval operation is usually planned and executed when one
side is forced onto the defensive at sea by permanent or temporary weakness.
Then, the weaker side may conduct major defensive naval operations to oppose
attacks on its naval bases and anchorages, enemy amphibious landings and at-
tacks on coastal installations or facilities, and to carry out major evacuations of
friendly troops and civilians. Both sides in a war at sea will occasionally mount
major naval or joint operations in defense and protection of maritime trade.
A major naval operation is conducted as an integral part of a maritime, and
sometimes a land, campaign. It is aimed at bringing about a radical or drastic
change in the operational situation in a maritime theater; if a major naval opera-
tion is only partially successful, the operational situation is likely to remain as it
had been, as the battle of Jutland in June 1916 illustrates. A major naval opera-
tion can have a strategic effect as well. This usually occurs when a surprise attack
on a major part of the enemy’s fleet is carried out at the very onset of hostilities,
to accomplish a strategic objective in a principal theater of operations. For ex-
ample, the operational objective of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 De-
cember 1941 was to destroy enough of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to prevent it from
interfering with the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. However, the unin-
tended and highly negative (for Japan) effect was to shift American public opin-
ion from isolationism to unequivocal support for complete victory over Japan.
A war at sea predominantly consists of a large number of tactical actions con-
ducted in coastal waters, on the high seas, and also on the open ocean. Such major
and minor tactical actions can accomplish specific operational objectives, but only
after a longer time. However, the key to ultimate success in war at sea is avoiding sit-
uations in which objectives must be accomplished predominantly—or even worse,
exclusively—through force-to-force encounters or attrition. Attrition warfare not
only results in much higher losses, even for the stronger side, in terms of lives and
materiel but is inherently protracted. One’s forces are tied down, and until given op-
erational objectives are accomplished they cannot be employed for other urgent
tasks in other oceans or sea areas. This happened to the Allies in the struggle for
Guadalcanal between August 1942 and February 1943. The initial major naval oper-
ation—the amphibious landing on Guadalcanal (Operation WATCHTOWER) on 7
August 1942—was highly successful. Afterward, however, the Allies became pro-
gressively involved in a series of small but costly tactical actions with Japanese forces
on land, at sea, and in the air. This included seven major naval battles, most of them
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fought in the night, and numerous smaller tactical actions at sea.29 The U.S. Navy
lost most of these battles, because the Japanese were much more proficient in night
gunnery and torpedo tactics. However, both sides lost approximately the same
number of ships.30 This attrition phase lasted almost seven months before the Japa-
nese decided to give up their attempts to regain control of Guadalcanal. By then, the
Allied operational tempo had been considerably slowed; no further major landings
up the Solomons chain had been possible with Guadalcanal not yet secure. A good
argument can be made that had the Allies been able to conduct a consecutive major
naval or air operation to consolidate initial operational success, the struggle for
Guadalcanal would have ended much earlier and with far smaller losses in ships, air-
craft, and personnel for the Allies.
Types
Based on the degree of participation of various services and arms, naval, joint
(multiservice), and combined (multinational) major naval operations can be
differentiated. A major naval operation, as such, is conducted predominantly by
a navy, although air or even ground forces can take part as well. Examples of ma-
jor operations conducted by naval forces are the battles of Cape Matapan
(March 1941), the Coral Sea (May 1942), Midway (June 1942), and the Philip-
pine Sea (June 1944).
A major naval/joint operation is planned and conducted by forces of the navy
but with substantial participation by other services. In a maritime theater en-
compassing a large ocean or sea area, major naval operations would involve sig-
nificant air forces, and maybe ground forces as well. In contrast, major naval
operations in littoral waters are likely to require participation of all three ser-
vices. All major amphibious landing operations are inherently joint, as are major
operations against enemy maritime trade or in defense of maritime trade in the
littorals.
A major naval/combined operation is conducted with two or more navies or
services of the armed forces of two or more countries. Today, major combined
operations constitute a frequent method of employing naval forces in low-
intensity conflict. In fact, because of the downsizing of most navies, they might
well become routine for major regional contingencies or even general war. A
major amphibious landing operation is sometimes combined with it, as was the
case in the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) in July 1943, the landing in
Normandy (NEPTUNE) in June 1944, and the UN amphibious landing at Inchon
(CHROMITE) in September 1950.
Sometimes several major naval/joint operations can take place in a single
maritime theater of operations. Such a situation would occur in the initial phase
of a new campaign when several operational objectives must be accomplished
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sequentially or simultaneously. In that case, the one aimed at the most impor-
tant operational objective will be the main or principal operation, and the oth-
ers will be supporting (ancillary) operations. For example, the Allied
amphibious landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944 was the main or principal ma-
jor naval/combined operation. The actions of Task Force (TF) 38 as distant
cover and support between 17 October and 27 November constituted a support-
ing major naval operation.
In terms of their timing, one can distinguish between initial, successive, and
preliminary major naval operations. The initial major operation is planned and
conducted to accomplish the first, and most operational, objective in a cam-
paign. For example, the Japanese Operation MI (that is, the battle of Midway)
was the initial major naval operation in a projected maritime campaign in the
Central Pacific. The Allied invasion of the Gilberts in November 1943 (GAL-
VANIC) was the initial major joint operation in a series of major operations
within the Central Pacific campaign (November 1943–September 1944). A suc-
cessive (or consecutive) major operation normally starts during or shortly after
the initial major operation. Its purpose is to consolidate or expand the opera-
tional success of the preceding major operations. The U.S. invasions of the Mar-
shals (Operations FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE) and the Marianas (FORAGER)
are examples. A preliminary major naval operation is usually planned to isolate a
maritime area of operations in which a new campaign or major operation is to
be conducted. The purpose is often to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforce-
ments in troops, aircraft, or materiel. Another purpose might be to deceive the
enemy as to the intended sector of main effort. For example, TF-38’s series of air
strikes and other actions against the Ryukyus, Formosa, and Luzon between 10
and 17 October 1944 constituted a preliminary major naval operation—that is,
with respect to the invasion of Leyte.
Major naval operations can be conducted on the open ocean or in the littorals
(waters contiguous to the continental landmass, and peripheral, enclosed, and
semienclosed seas, respectively). Most major naval operations have taken place
fairly close to continents, large islands, or oceanic archipelagoes. Many have
taken place in enclosed or semienclosed seas (collectively called “narrow seas”).
Today, because of enormous advances in the range and lethality of weapons,
even coastal navies composed of small surface ships, submarines, and land-
based aircraft can conduct major naval operations.
Major naval operations in the littorals are generally more complicated to pre-
pare and execute than those on the open ocean, because they involve diverse
forces and assets of all services of the country’s armed forces. They also differ
from major naval operations on the open ocean because of the much smaller op-
erational space involved and the smaller forces used.
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The initial position used by one’s forces in the initial phase of a major naval or
joint operation often considerably affects the course of the operation as a whole,
sometimes even its outcome. In general, the force can operate from a central or exte-
rior position. In the case of employment of multiservice or multinational forces in
the same operation, some forces can operate from central positions, others from ex-
terior positions. Each position has some advantages and some disadvantages in re-
spect to the employment of naval forces and aviation. It would be a mistake to
believe that a central position is inherently more advantageous than an exterior one.
Experience shows that not only victories but also defeats have ensued for forces op-
erating from a central position.
A major naval/joint operation can be conducted along interior or exterior lines
of operations. Interior lines are completely or partially enveloped by the enemy;
hence, they originate from a central position. The opposing force, then, operates
along exterior lines.31 Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914) observed that inte-
rior lines are in fact a central position prolonged in one or more directions. “In-
terior line” implies that from a central position one can assemble more quickly
on either of two opposite fronts than the enemy can and therefore can utilize
forces more effectively.32
Moving along interior lines, one’s naval forces can be interposed between two or
more parts of the enemy force, concentrating against one as quickly as possible in
order to destroy the bulk of the enemy force, while holding the others in check with
a force that is possibly inferior. Interior lines are inherently shorter than those the
hostile force occupies on the periphery, a fact that can be used effectively in both
offense and defense. The key prerequisites for the success of major naval opera-
tions on interior lines, then, are sufficient physical space and ability to move
forces quickly.33 For example, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 the Japa-
nese fleet occupied a central position between the Russian major naval bases at
Port Arthur and Vladivostok and checkmated both places. The Japanese armies
could be transported across the Tsushima Strait and through the Yellow Sea be-
cause the Japanese fleet was interposed between the Russian Far Eastern Squad-
ron in Vladivostok and the force in Port Arthur. Thus, the Japanese fleet
commander, Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1846–1934), could prevent the junction
of the Russian squadrons to interfere with Japanese communications. In an-
other example, TF-58 and TF-38 operated along interior lines during the battle of
the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and the battle for Leyte (October 1944), respectively.
A force is said to operate along exterior lines when its lines of movement are
separated by those of the enemy. These lines are generally longer than the short-
est line the enemy force can use. A major naval/joint operation conducted along
exterior or converging lines comprises concentric advances from several sea or
ocean areas toward common physical objectives. The most important prerequisite
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for the proper use of exterior lines is sufficient combat strength in each part of
one’s forces.34
The advantages and disadvantages of exterior lines are the reverse of those of
interior lines. Exterior lines allow simultaneous concentric actions from several
directions against the enemy’s center.35 A force moving along exterior lines can
select the point of attack along the enemy’s periphery. Exterior lines generally fa-
cilitate the shifting of forces to meet an external threat while maintaining com-
munications and covering distances to approach the enemy’s force. The inherent
advantage of a force moving along exterior lines is that it can threaten the enemy
with envelopment. However, such a force moves along longer lines of operations
than its opponent does. The greater the distance between the base of operations
and the attack objective, the longer the lines of supply. Also, unless each force el-
ement is stronger than the enemy force opposed to it, there is a constant danger
of defeat in detail. An inherent feature of all amphibious landings is that the at-
tack forces initially operate from an exterior position. Once the amphibious
forces land ashore, they operate from a central position and along interior lines.
Not only must a force operating along exterior lines move faster than its oppo-
nent moving along interior lines, but also its adjacent elements have to keep within
mutual supporting distance, if, again, the force is to avoid being defeated in detail.
Sometimes forces can operate beyond mutually supporting distance, provided that
each prong of the advance is stronger than possible opposition, as illustrated by the
Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies in December 1941–April 1942.
A major naval or joint operation from an exterior position also requires precise
synchronization of movement and actions by one’s forces. This is difficult to
achieve, especially when the distance between one’s base of operations and the
physical objective is great. For example, in the Leyte operation, the Japanese First
and Second Diversionary Attack forces and the Mobile Force (Main Body)
started their movements toward the Philippines from exterior positions. Like-
wise, the TF-38 carrier force operated from the exterior in regard to its targets on
Luzon, the central Philippines, and adjacent sea areas. The Allied amphibious
force that landed at Leyte also operated from an exterior position during its
transit and approach phases.
MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WAR
In generic terms, the main purposes of a major naval/joint operation today in
the case of a high-intensity conflict at sea can be to
• Destroy the enemy fleet at sea or in its bases
• Conduct an amphibious landing on the opposed shore
• Destroy enemy coastal installations and facilities
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• Attack enemy maritime trade
• Defend and protect one’s own maritime trade
• Destroy enemy sea-based strategic nuclear forces
• Protect one’s own sea-based strategic nuclear forces
• Support friendly ground forces on the coast.
A major operation aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its base is the
quickest and most effective—but most difficult—way to establish sea control in
a given maritime area of operations. These operations can be conducted on the
open ocean or in narrow seas. Historically, several major operations have been
aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its bases at or shortly before the
outbreak of hostilities. Most fleet-on-fleet encounters in World War II took
place when one fleet provided distant cover and support of a major amphibious
landing, as happened at Leyte in October 1944, or when the stronger fleet used
the landing to lure an inferior force into a “decisive” battle, as the Japanese Com-
bined Fleet attempted in Operation MI, which led to the battle of Midway in June
1942.
A major naval or joint operation to destroy an enemy fleet might be necessary
when the attacker provides support of the flank to his forces operating in the
coastal area or when the enemy fleet is forced to operate in a certain sea or ocean
area. If the stronger side at sea attempts to isolate certain sea/ocean areas, then
the objective could be the destruction of major parts of the enemy fleet forces.
Likewise, though a major operation to destroy the enemy fleet at sea is difficult
for a numerically weaker side, that side might decide to plan one in order to
weaken or lift a blockade. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, such an oper-
ational objective could be accomplished by massive strikes by surface combat-
ants, submarines, and land-based aircraft. Preparation time would have to be
short because of rapid changes in the situation at sea and in the air. Such an op-
eration would most likely encompass a single phase, with one or several syn-
chronized strikes by naval forces, aircraft, and coastal missile or artillery
batteries.36
Major naval/joint operations in distant ocean areas are not likely to be con-
ducted in the near future, because there are no longer two or more major poten-
tial opponents at sea. A more likely scenario is a conflict between the navies of
riparian states in an enclosed or semienclosed sea, or between a blue-water navy
and a coastal navy operating in the littorals. Hence, attacks on naval bases or an-
chorages, combined with attacks at sea, seem to be the most likely method open
to a stronger navy to destroy or neutralize a smaller fleet.
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A prerequisite for success in a major naval operation to destroy an enemy fleet
in its bases is usually local, temporary sea control. However, this is not always
necessary. In the past, the best results were achieved by striking from beyond the
effective range of the enemy’s defenses. Today, nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines, modern conventionally powered submarines, land- and carrier-based
aircraft, and surface ships armed with long-range cruise missiles are the most ef-
fective platforms for destroying enemy ships in their bases. Attack submarines
armed with antiship missiles or land-attack cruise missiles can strike enemy na-
val bases from several hundred nautical miles away. For example, in the first few
days after the start of the air offensive against Iraq on 17 January 1991, American
carrier-based aircraft and attack submarines deployed in the Arabian Gulf and
the Red Sea repeatedly struck Iraqi naval installations near Umm Qasr and Basra
with “smart” bombs and Tomahawk missiles.37
Air strikes against enemy naval bases in an enclosed sea, such as the Arabian
(Persian) Gulf, can be far more effective than those mounted from the open
ocean, because of the much shorter distances and the larger number of
land-based aircraft that can be used. These strikes can be conducted with high
intensity and repeated at short intervals. In some instances, not only fixed-wing
aircraft but also missile-armed helicopters can be effectively employed.
In the initial phase of a war in an enclosed sea theater, the principal objective
of a major naval operation would be to obtain the desired degree of sea control,
thereby creating favorable conditions for carrying out other operational tasks—
specifically, supporting friendly ground forces on the coast. An absolute prereq-
uisite would be air superiority in the maritime theater.38 The objective would be
accomplished by destroying the enemy’s surface forces and submarines; destroy-
ing or suppressing tactical air forces at their airfields; destroying enemy antisub-
marine forces at sea, in their bases, or at airfields; suppressing or destroying
enemy air defenses; and suppressing or interfering with command posts and
electronic surveillance. In the second phase of the operation, the fleet forces
would carry out strikes against enemy forces at sea and their bases and airfields
in the sea’s only exit and its approaches.39
Amphibious landing operations are the most effective ways of projecting
power on an enemy shore. They are also extremely complex to plan and execute.
They are inherently joint in character, regardless of their purpose or the size of
the forces involved. Amphibious assault landings within enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas would take place across much shorter distances and are normally
smaller than those mounted against coasts on open oceans. Sometimes, how-
ever, an invasion mounted across a narrow sea can exert a strategic influence, in
the case of the opening of a new front, as was true of the Allied Normandy
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invasion of June 1944, or causing a radical change in a strategic situation, as in
the case of the UN landing at Inchon in September 1950.
Today, a large-scale amphibious landing in an enclosed or semienclosed sea
would be difficult to execute if the defender effectively used land-based aircraft,
submarines, and combat craft in combination. Amphibious landings are aimed
at seizing an area of enemy-controlled coast that gives access to a military opera-
tional objective inland; speeding the advance of one’s troops along the coast or
the end of the war itself; eliminating or taking control of a large naval base or
port; preventing the adversary from seizing a base or port; cutting off an enemy
army’s avenue of escape; and countering enemy evacuation efforts across the
sea. A credible amphibious capability may also help to tie a sizable enemy force
to the defense of a large stretch of its mainland coast or offshore islands.
In U.S. terms, the emerging doctrine of Operational Maneuver from the Sea
(OMFTS) developed by the Marine Corps represents the application of opera-
tional art in planning and conducting amphibious landings. The tactical com-
ponent of this concept, the ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), envisions
moving Marine air-ground task forces directly to the assigned operational ob-
jective deep in the enemy’s rear. Such an action will be carried out without stop-
ping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones. STOM is
predicated on the existence of a sea base deployed in international waters.40
A major naval operation aimed to destroy enemy coastal installations and facili-
ties can be conducted as a preliminary to an amphibious landing or as an integral
part of a naval blockade. Such major operations can be conducted with naval or
air forces or with both jointly. The primary purpose of attacks can be destruction
or neutralization of the enemy naval or commercial ports, airfields and airports,
shipbuilding and ship-repair industries, rail and road traffic, shore/offshore oil
and gas production, and refining industries. For example, the main purpose of
TF-38’s attacks in mid-October 1944 was to destroy Japanese ports, shipyards, and
airfields in the Ryukyus and on Formosa and Luzon. Today, longer-range and more
capable carrier- and land-based aircraft, armed with cruise missiles and “smart”
bombs, make it possible to attack the enemy coastal installation and facilities
along a large part of the enemy coast and far into the depth of his defenses. Major
navies today have a much greater ability than in the past to attack a variety of tar-
gets far in the enemy’s operational and even strategic depths.
Major naval operations on the open ocean and in littoral waters are conducted
to interrupt or cut off enemy maritime trade or to defend and protect one’s own mari-
time trade.41 Maritime trade is conducted almost continuously for the duration of
a war at sea. Each convoy or independent sailing ship represents only a fraction
of the traffic volume in a maritime theater at a given time. Correspondingly,
most naval actions attacking the enemy’s or defending and protecting friendly
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maritime trade will be tactical in character. Major operations will be conducted
only occasionally and then only in a certain part of the sea or ocean. When a major
effort must be mounted to attack or protect a large convoy, its objective is an oper-
ational one.
To be effective, actions against the enemy’s military-economic potential must
be conducted systematically over a relatively large area and against all the ele-
ments of the enemy’s maritime trade. Specifically, this includes attacks on en-
emy convoys, independently sailing ships, ports, and cargo loading and
off-loading facilities; rail and road junctions in the littoral area; shipyards and
ship-repair facilities; and shipping-related industries. In enclosed seas, attacks
on enemy maritime trade and protection of one’s own are usually made with the
full participation of not only one’s naval forces but also land-based air and, in
some cases, coastal defense forces and ground forces. Such a major operation
would usually consist of a single phase, but it would be conducted with high in-
tensity. Some such operations could be divided into phases, with short pauses
between.
A major naval operation aimed to interrupt or cut off enemy traffic would
normally be conducted when sea control is in dispute or the enemy has slight su-
periority. Such an operation would consist of a series of massive missile, torpedo,
air, and artillery strikes, plus offensive use of mines. Some theoreticians claim
that enemy maritime traffic can be considered interrupted when traffic in a cer-
tain area is reduced by 20 to 25 percent, while cutting off maritime traffic means
dropping total volume by 40 to 50 percent.42
An attack on the enemy’s maritime traffic in the littorals would consist pri-
marily of smaller naval tactical actions conducted over relatively large areas of
the maritime theater and over time. Such actions would be aimed at interrupt-
ing enemy shipping traffic to such a degree as to have an effect on land-front
combat. A major naval operation would usually be planned and executed when
there was significant enemy traffic in a certain area. It could also be aimed
against ships carrying raw materials. Such an operation would be unified by a
common concept and carried out in several phases. The prerequisite for the suc-
cess of such an operation is full knowledge of all elements of the enemy’s mari-
time trade. Aviation, submarines, special forces, and coastal defense forces
would take part in such an operation.43
One of the most effective methods of preserving the maritime component of
one’s military-economic potential is a major naval/joint operation to defend and
protect maritime trade. Specifically, such an operation is aimed at preventing in-
terruption or cutoff of shipping carrying troops, weapons, military equipment,
or strategic raw materials. In some cases, such an operation can be aimed to pro-
tect friendly shipping lines in coastal waters.44 It is indicated when shipping
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lanes must be made secure or when friendly convoys must be protected from at-
tack. Normally such an operation can be executed in a single phase. Its duration
depends on the length of the shipping routes, how long ships stay in ports and
anchorages, and convoy-assembly time. Smaller convoys and individual ships
can sail independently, without protection.45
Today, only large navies have the capability to mount major operations aimed
at destroying the enemy’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces—that is, ballistic-mis-
sile submarines (SSBNs) and their supporting elements. Such major operations
might be focused on destroying enemy SSBNs either in their basing areas, in their
patrol zones, or in transit between them. Likewise, a major naval operation might
be conducted to protect one’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces. Such major opera-
tions would most likely be carried out predominantly by naval forces, specifically
nuclear-powered attack submarines in the open ocean and patrol aircraft over-
head. However, in areas closer to one’s own or the enemy’s coast, such operations
will probably be more joint, because air forces will be expected to take part.
Major naval operations in support of ground forces on the coast are conducted
both in marginal seas of oceans and in semienclosed or enclosed seas. They may
become most frequent in the seas bordering continents (e.g., the Black Sea, the
Baltic, or the Arabian Gulf). Tactical actions are a dominant method by which
fleet and air forces support troops on the coast. However, a major naval opera-
tion can be planned to destroy a hostile fleet threatening one’s troops operating
along the coast; to seize, by an amphibious landing, a major island, strait, or part
of the enemy-held coast; to defend one’s own coast against an amphibious land-
ing; to attack the enemy’s or protect one’s maritime trade; to conduct a large-
scale evacuation of troops or civilians; and so on.
One’s naval forces would play the principal role in major anti-amphibious
operations. Such operations would be carried out against enemy landings re-
gardless of the ratio of forces. Success would depend on timely detection of the
enemy movement to land, activation of coastal defense systems, and deployment
of forces. A major anti-amphibious operation would normally consist of four
main phases: strikes against the assembly areas of the enemy invasion forces, ac-
tions to destroy enemy forces at sea, the battle for the bridgehead, and engage-
ments in the depth of the landing objective area. For each phase, the defender
should determine an objective to be accomplished.46
Major Naval Operations vs. Naval Tactical Actions
Major naval operations differ considerably from naval tactical actions in terms
of the level of command that plans, prepares, and executes them; the decision-
making and planning processes; force composition; the size of the sea or ocean
area in which combat takes place; its duration; and the scale of combat support.
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Major naval operations should be planned, prepared, and conducted by the
naval component or functional commanders (e.g., in U.S. terms, numbered fleet
commanders and joint/combined force maritime component commanders, or
JFMCC/CFMCC) subordinate to a theater commander (that is, commanders of
theaters of war or of operations). Sometimes an operational-tactical com-
mander (or joint task force commander) and staff can plan and conduct major
naval/joint operations. Unlike a tactical commander, the operational com-
mander also has overall responsibility for logistical support and sustainment.
The decision to fight a naval tactical action is based upon a short-term esti-
mate of the situation, while determination upon a major naval operation re-
quires what is known as a “long-range estimate.” In preparing that estimate,
especially for a major naval/joint operation in the littorals, the operational com-
mander must take into account all aspects of the situation in a given theater—
military, political, economic, sociological, ethnic, and climatic—projecting
them for several weeks or months. Because of the resulting much wider range of
uncertainty and the larger scope of a major operation, in comparison to a tacti-
cal action, a long-range estimate of the situation will necessarily contain more
assumptions. In turn, the more assumptions a plan contains, the more likely it is
to require alteration, modification, or radical changes, or even have to be aban-
doned during the execution phase.
In contrast to a naval tactical action, major naval/joint operations are invari-
ably planned ahead of time. They are normally prepared, except for the initial
phase of a war at sea, only when forces have at least local superiority over their
opponent, whereas tactical actions can be conducted regardless of the ratio of
forces. Major operations and campaigns are planned using a “regressive”
method, in which the ultimate operational objective is determined first and
then, working backward, several major tactical and some minor tactical objec-
tives are determined.
A major naval/joint operation normally requires larger and more diverse
forces than a naval tactical action. For example, in the battle of Midway in June
1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet employed four separate elements totaling
165 warships.47 The U.S. forces that took part in the battle of Midway consisted
of seventy-six warships and about 110 land-based Army, Navy, and Marine air-
craft based on the island of Midway.48 However, some major naval operations in
World War II involved fewer ships and aircraft. In the “Bismarck Chase”
(RHEINUEBUNG, for the Germans) the Germans directly employed the Bismarck
group, six escort tankers, and one supply ship; three destroyers, two patrol ships,
two blockade breakers (Sperrbrecher), one minesweeper flotilla, thirteen U-boats,
one Italian submarine, and three Luftwaffe air groups were also used, in support.49
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For its part, the Royal Navy employed directly or indirectly five battleships, three
battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, eleven cruisers, thirty-three destroyers, and
eight submarines to defeat Combat Group Bismarck.50
Enormous increases in mobility and in the range and lethality of weapons al-
low operational objectives today to be accomplished with smaller forces than
would have been possible only a few decades ago. Today’s major blue-water na-
vies possess far fewer ships than they did during World War II or the early 1950s.
A major naval operation in littoral waters will include more small ships and
land-based aircraft than would those on the open ocean.51 Such an operation re-
quires the employment of a variety of naval combat arms and often of air forces;
in the littoral waters, such operations would also require the participation of
ground forces.
Forces taking part in a major operation on the open ocean are deployed over a
large part of a theater of operations, even though the majority of its constituent
tactical actions take place in a single maritime area. For example, the forces that
took part, in some way, in the battle of Midway operated from the Japanese
home islands to the American West Coast and from the Aleutians to the Central
Pacific. The battle for Leyte, in the larger sense, covered an area of about 432,000
square miles (including the eighty-five thousand square miles of the Philip-
pines) and encompassed a major part of the western Pacific and smaller sectors
of the central, southern, and southwestern Pacific. The actual fighting, however,
encompassed only about 110,000 square miles.52
Major naval/joint operations in the future are most likely to take place in en-
closed or semienclosed seas, such as the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, or in such pe-
ripheral waters as the South China Sea. Yet a blue-water force like the U.S. Navy
would deploy its forces, other than those already deployed forward, from bases
in the continental United States or other maritime theaters.
A major naval operation lasts considerably longer than a naval tactical action.
While a naval battle or engagement is fought in several hours or less, a major na-
val operation can last a week or more. In general, a major naval operation in a
high-intensity conflict lasts longer if the distance between the base of operations
and the operating area is great or if the opposing force is difficult to destroy or
neutralize because of its size or peculiarities of the physical environment. Such
an operation also takes much longer to the extent that the objective is nonmili-
tary in nature, as would be the case in counterinsurgency or peace enforcement.
Characteristics
The main characteristics of a modern major naval/joint operation are the com-
plexity of its planning, preparation, and execution; the involvement of diverse
naval combat arms and often combat arms or branches of other services;
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diversity of tactical actions in a relatively large part of the theater; high intensity
of combat and proportionately high losses; extensive use of electronic warfare
techniques; and the complexity of combat support required.
Because of the enormous increase in the combat potential of platforms, ma-
jor naval operations of the future are likely to be highly intense indeed. This will
be especially true in a littoral environment, because of the small area and corre-
spondingly short distances. For that reason, in major naval operations today ex-
tremely high consumption rates of fuel and ammunition should be expected.
A major naval or joint operation in the littorals differs considerably from one
on the open ocean because of the much more complex physical environment
and, as noted, short distances between points. Among other things,
geomorphological and hydrographic (or oceanographic) features in narrow seas
greatly affect the employment of naval platforms, weapons, and sensors. The
coast in a typical narrow sea is usually highly indented and fronted by a large
number of islands and islets. This configuration greatly restricts the maneuver-
ability of surface ships, especially major surface combatants and submarines. In
shallow waters, large surface ships have to reduce their speeds sharply. Naviga-
tional conditions in narrow seas are often difficult because of shoals, reefs,
strong tides, and currents.
A major naval operation in an enclosed or semienclosed sea will most likely
encompass the entire body of water. The combat will take place on the surface,
subsurface, on the coast, and in the air. Diverse combat arms of the navy and
other services will be extensively employed. Covertness of action and opportu-
nities for achieving surprise are considerably enhanced by the combination of
modern long-range and highly lethal weapons, such as antiship missiles and tor-
pedoes, and the nature of the physical environment. Here again, combat be-
tween modern naval forces is likely to be short and intense and to result in high
losses.
One of the main features of modern naval combat in an enclosed or
semienclosed sea will be quick and frequent changes in the operational or even
strategic situation. Modern electronic warfare techniques will be extensively
used by both sides. This will cause great difficulties in using sensors and guided
weapons, even make it impossible. The high speed of modern ships and aircraft
and their ability to combine maneuver with “fires” allow one’s side to achieve
surprise as well as to gain superiority in place and time.
Combat actions in enclosed or semienclosed seas will of choice occur largely
at night or in bad visibility. That necessarily means fighting at close range, mak-
ing the deployment, redeployment, and maneuver of forces more difficult. In a
typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, land-based aircraft will be one of the most
effective means for striking enemy shipping and facilities. Their high degree of
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readiness and maneuverability enables aircraft to concentrate strikes against
transports, warships, or aircraft covering enemy ships at sea.
Elements
A major naval/joint operation in war, regardless of its purpose, comprises three
main phases: deployment, combat employment, and postcombat. As for deploy-
ment, naval forces can conduct, depending on the initial bases, only operational
deployment (i.e., within a given maritime theater of operations) or, in some
cases, strategic deployment (movement from one maritime theater to another)
(see figure). If one’s forces are forward deployed, as are U.S. Navy forces cur-
rently in the western Pacific and in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, in case of hostili-
ties they would need to conduct an operational or even merely tactical
deployment. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, however, because of the
generally much smaller area, naval forces would conduct tactical, rarely opera-
tional, deployments.
The combat phase of a major naval/joint operation would consist of one or
more phases, differing in duration. Normally, combat would take place in a sec-
tor of main effort and one or more sectors of secondary effort. The major part of
one’s forces, arbitrarily called “main forces,” would be employed in the former,
while the rest, “supporting forces,” would operate in the latter. The actions of
one’s main forces would be focused at destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s
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operational center of gravity in a series of related major and minor tactical ac-
tions. Supporting forces would at the same time try to tie down enemy forces to
facilitate the success of the main forces. Normally, deception would be conducted
in a sector of secondary effort. The cumulative effect should be accomplishment
of the assigned operational objective. In the case of an offensive major naval/
joint operation this operational success must be consolidated by pursuing and
destroying the remaining enemy forces. The shift from combat phase to pursuit
should be seamless, but an operational pause after the end of pursuit might be
required to regenerate one’s combat potential. Thereafter, forces might withdraw
to their base or be redeployed for other tasks in the same or an adjacent theater.
Tactical actions in a major naval operation are not just a random collection of
various combat actions but are all related to each other. They can be fought on
the surface, subsurface, in the air, or, in some cases, on the coast. They are all con-
nected by and conducted within a given operational framework; otherwise, they
would not contribute to the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective
and would therefore represent a waste of resources and sorely needed time.
Naval tactical actions can range from actions in which weapons are not used
(such as patrolling and surveillance) to attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and
naval battles. As the term implies, they are aimed at accomplishing major or mi-
nor tactical objectives in a given part of a maritime theater. In some cases, a series
of diverse tactical actions conducted over time can lead to the accomplishment
of an operational objective.
The lowest and the most frequently conducted tactical action using weapons
is a naval attack, a combination of tactical maneuver and weapons used to ac-
complish a minor tactical objective. It is usually an integral part of a strike. A na-
val attack can be conducted by a single or several types of platforms. It is usually
aimed to destroy or neutralize a single enemy platform, tactical groups, or a tar-
get ashore. Attacks can be distinguished by the type of weapons used—missile,
gun, torpedo, bomb, depth charge, or a combination thereof.53 A naval attack
can be conducted independently or as part of a strike or raid. The success of a na-
val attack depends largely on the surprise achieved, the degree of skill in maneu-
vering a platform or several platforms to obtain positional advantage, and the
range, lethality, and precision of the weapons used. An example of a naval attack
was the action by the U.S. submarines Darter and Dace on 23 October 1944 dur-
ing the opening phase of the battle for Leyte. This attack resulted in the sinking
of two Japanese heavy cruisers (Atago and Takao).54 The actions of U.S. motor
torpedo boats and destroyers in the battle of the Surigao Strait on the night of
24–25 October are examples of naval attacks conducted by single-type plat-
forms. In the Battle of Samar on 25 October, U.S. destroyers conducted torpedo
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counterattacks against Japanese heavy surface ships of the 1st Diversionary At-
tack Force.
With the advent of missiles and other long-range, highly precise, and lethal
weapons, it became possible to destroy the enemy force at sea or on the coast at
much longer range than with guns or torpedoes. The long-range missiles and
smart bombs can be fired or dropped by a single or several ships, submarines, or
aircraft and in quick succession. A new method of combat force employment,
called “strike,” gradually replaced the naval battle and engagement as the princi-
pal method of accomplishing not only a major tactical but sometimes even an
operational objective in war at sea and in the air. A well prepared strike is diffi-
cult to repulse. By using longer-range, more lethal weapons, the attacking forces
can achieve success without suffering significant losses.55
Depending on the scale and importance of the target to be destroyed or neu-
tralized, strikes can be differentiated as tactical, operational, or strategic. How-
ever, destroying or neutralizing these targets is not identical to accomplishing
the corresponding military objective; a number of targets must be struck and
destroyed before an objective is achieved. A naval strike is usually conducted by
two or more platforms of a single type of force—for example, missile surface com-
batants, submarines, or attack aircraft (helicopters). On an island-studded,
archipelago-type coast, missile- or torpedo-armed surface combatants can con-
duct strikes from ambush against much stronger hostile forces. A strike can be
carried out using conventional weapons (missiles, torpedoes, guns, bombs, etc.)
or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During the Yom Kippur (Ramadan)
War, the Israeli navy conducted several successful strikes against the Egyptian
and Syrian ships at sea. For example, a force of five Israeli missile craft struck a
group of Syrian ships off Latakia on the night of 6–7 October 1973, sinking three
Syrian missile craft, one torpedo boat, and a minesweeper.56
Usually, in a strike conducted with several weapons, longer-range weapons
are used first, to weaken the enemy’s defenses; then short-range weapons finish
off the target. Thus, in a strike by missile-armed and torpedo-armed surface
combatants, antiship missiles would be fired first, followed after a certain inter-
val by torpedoes to finish off the enemy’s ships damaged by the missiles. A
broader form of strike is a naval raid—conducted by a single or several naval
combat arms to accomplish a tactical objective as a part of a major offensive or
defensive naval operation. The aim is usually to deny temporarily some position
or to capture or destroy an enemy force, coastal installation, or facility.57 One’s
temporary or local control of the sea is not a prerequisite for the success of a raid.
The stronger fleet can also conduct raids to divert the enemy’s attention or force
the enemy to react in a secondary sector of effort.
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A naval raid is usually conducted against an objective that the enemy consid-
ers so valuable that its loss or serious degradation could not be ignored. A larger
purpose of a naval raid is to accomplish some temporary advantage and also
pose a threat of future repetition. Besides destroying installations, facilities, or
forces on the coast, a naval raid can be aimed to enhance one’s own morale or di-
minish that of the enemy. The action can range in scale from very small to very
large; a large-scale raid can have many features of a major naval operation.
In the Gulf War of 1990–91, a landing party from a U.S. frigate seized Jazirat
Qurah Island in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf.58 A day later, a landing
party and helicopter from another U.S. frigate captured the oil platforms in the
Durah oil field.59 In contrast, the Allied Dieppe raid (Operation JUBILEE), con-
ducted on 19 August 1942, can be considered a significant military effort; some
6,100 troops, mostly Canadians, and 252 ships were employed. The main pur-
pose of the Dieppe raid was to test German coastal defenses. After heavy fighting
in which the Allies, especially Canadian troops, suffered heavy casualties (about
1,180 killed and 2,190 taken prisoner), the operation ended in unmitigated di-
saster for the Allies; the entire effort was abandoned.60
The effect of a raid, like that of surprise, is usually transitory. However, de-
pending on the enemy’s reaction, the consequences of a well executed raid can
be much greater than initially planned. For example, the raid on Tokyo on 18
April 1942, popularly known as the “Doolittle Raid,” carried out by sixteen B-25
medium bombers launched from the carrier Hornet (CV 8) of Task Force 16
(TF-16), was an example of a naval raid that resulted in strategic consequences.
It was launched about 670 miles from Tokyo, had a tremendous psychological
impact on the Japanese, and greatly lifted American morale. A more important
consequence of the raid was that the Japanese navy thereafter won the internal
Japanese debate on whether to expand its defense perimeter in the Pacific.61 This
led to the Japanese decision to initiate a new campaign in the central Pacific, of
which Operation MI was the initial major naval operation. In the end, the Japa-
nese suffered a disastrous defeat in the battle of Midway in early June 1942,
which, in retrospect, was a turning point in the war in the Pacific.
In the past, a naval engagement consisted of a series of related strikes/
counterstrikes and attacks/counterattacks conducted by main forces and aimed
to accomplish the most important tactical objective in a naval battle. The clashes
of opposing carrier forces in the Coral Sea in 1942, the battle of Midway in June
1942, and the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 were examples of naval
engagements.
A naval battle was until relatively recently the main method of accomplishing
a major tactical objective as a part of a major naval operation. It consisted of a
series of related attacks, counterattacks, strikes, and counterstrikes coordinated
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in time and place. It was characterized by relatively long duration—several
hours or even longer.62 Several naval combat arms, and often the combat arms of
other services (e.g., air force, or troops defending the coast), participated in a na-
val battle. In World War II, numerous naval battles took place in almost all ocean
or sea areas. The battles of Savo Island on 9 August and of Tassafaronga on 30
November 1942, fought between the Japanese and the Allied surface ships, are
examples of naval battles. Defeat of the enemy fleet in a naval battle can some-
times result in not only operational but also strategic victory. To complicate the
matter, however, a naval battle can be tactically won but nonetheless represent
an operational (or even strategic) failure. Also, it can be tactically won but oper-
ationally lost, as happened to the U.S. Navy in the battle of Santa Cruz Islands on
26–27 October 1942 in the lower Solomons, and to the Japanese in the battle of
Guadalcanal between 12 and 15 November 1942. For the near future at least,
large naval battles are unlikely to be fought because most of the actions would
take place between blue-water and coastal navies and in relatively small sea areas
close to the landmass.
Prerequisites
The success of a major naval/joint operation is highly dependent on synchroni-
zation of theaterwide or operational functions. Sound theater command orga-
nization, then, is perhaps one of the most important prerequisites for the success
of a campaign as a whole and of its subordinate major operations. All elements
of operational functions are integral parts of the theater command organiza-
tion. Other prerequisites for the success of a major naval operation include op-
erational intelligence, operational command and control warfare, operational
“fires,” operational logistics, and operational protection.
A major naval operation is the principal method of accomplishing operational
objectives in a maritime theater. It can be the most effective way to achieve deci-
sive results within a given time frame, bringing about a drastic change in the sit-
uation in a theater. The only alternative is attrition warfare, which should be
avoided even when an operational commander enjoys numerical superiority.
Nonetheless, Western naval theoreticians and planners have generally neglected
major naval operations as an area of study in operational art. Too much empha-
sis is given instead to the tactical employment of naval forces and to various
noncombat missions in operations short of war. The real danger is of creating
the impression that no major naval operations will be conducted in the future—
an impression that could not be more wrong. The absence of any serious threat
at sea today should not delude anyone into believing that naval forces will never
be required to plan and conduct major operations in the future. In any case, a
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regional conflict could require the U.S. Navy to plan for and execute a major na-
val operation. Threats to national interests at sea tend to come with little warn-
ing. Fleets are built and maintained primarily not to conduct low-intensity
conflict but to wage war, whether regional or global.
Major naval operations are categorized by their main purposes, the sea or
ocean areas in which they are predominantly conducted, their timing, and the
degree of participation by other services. Certain types have arisen from ad-
vances in naval technology and the evolution of warfare in maritime theaters.
While naval forces will always play the most critical role in accomplishing opera-
tional or strategic objectives, other services and their combat arms will increas-
ingly participate. This will be especially true in littoral waters, where the
proximity and influence of a landmass allows not only land-based aircraft but
ground forces to take part. Therefore, not only amphibious landings but also
major naval operations against enemy maritime trade and in defense of one’s
own will increasingly become joint or even combined activities.
The focus of theory should be on major naval operations of the types most
likely to be conducted. However, this does not mean that the other types of ma-
jor naval operations should be neglected. For example, because of the absence at
present of major naval opponents, major naval operations to destroy enemy
fleets at sea are not likely in the near future; nevertheless, it would be very wrong
for theoreticians to ignore them. Likewise, no blue-water navy, focusing on ma-
jor naval operations in littoral waters, should in the meantime neglect the possi-
bility of encounters on the open ocean.
The current highly unsatisfactory situation in maritime thought and doctrine
can continue only as long as the U.S. Navy and other Western navies do not face a
peer competitor. Adverse consequences may well then result if the opponent
strives for superiority not through number of platforms and advanced weapons
but by thinking and acting operationally instead of tactically.
NOTE S
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Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, JP 1-02 (12 April 2001, as amended
through 1 March 2007); JP 3-0, Joint Operations
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